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cloudflare Shedding old code with ecdysis: graceful restarts for Rust services at Cloudflare 2026-02-13 Manuel Olguín Muñoz ecdysis | ˈekdəsəs |noun the process of shedding the old skin (in reptiles) or casting off the outer cuticle (in insects and other arthropods). ecdysis | ˈekdəsəs | n…
datadog Following a massive system-wide outage in March 2023, Datadog successfully restored its EU1 region by identifying that a simple node reboot could resolve network connectivity issues caused by a faulty system patch. While the team managed to restore 100 percent of compute capacity within hours, the recovery effort was subsequently hindered by cloud provider infrastructure limits and IP address exhaustion. This post-mortem highlights the complexities of scaling hierarchical Kubernetes environments under extreme pressure and the importance of accounting for "black swan" capacity requirements. ## Hierarchical Kubernetes Recovery Datadog utilizes a strict hierarchy of Kubernetes clusters to manage its infrastructure, which necessitated a granular, three-tiered recovery approach. Because the outage affected network connectivity via `systemd-networkd`, the team had to restore components in a specific order to regain control of the environment. * **Parent Control Planes:** Engineers first rebooted the virtual machines hosting the parent clusters, which manage the control planes for all other clusters. * **Child Control Planes:** Once parent clusters were stable, the team restored the control planes for application clusters, which run as pods within the parent infrastructure. * **Application Worker Nodes:** Thousands of worker nodes across dozens of clusters were restarted progressively to avoid overwhelming the control planes, reaching full capacity by 12:05 UTC. ## Scaling Bottlenecks and Cloud Quotas Once the infrastructure was online, the team attempted to scale out rapidly to process a massive backlog of buffered data. This surge in demand triggered previously unencountered limitations within the Google Cloud environment. * **VPC Peering Limits:** At 14:18 UTC, the platform hit a documented but overlooked limit of 15,500 VM instances within a single network peering group, blocking all further scaling. * **Provider Intervention:** Datadog worked directly with Google Cloud support to manually raise the peering group limit, which allowed scaling to resume after a nearly four-hour delay. ## IP Address and Subnet Capacity Even after cloud-level instance quotas were lifted, specific high-traffic clusters processing logs and traces hit a secondary bottleneck related to internal networking. * **Subnet Exhaustion:** These clusters attempted to scale to more than twice their normal size, quickly exhausting all available IP addresses in their assigned subnets. * **Capacity Planning Gaps:** While Datadog typically targets a 66% maximum IP usage to allow for a 50% scale-out, the extreme demands of the recovery backlog exceeded these safety margins. * **Impact on Backlog:** For six hours, the lack of available IPs forced these clusters to process data significantly slower than the rest of the recovered infrastructure. ## Recovery Summary The EU1 recovery demonstrates that even when hardware is functional, software-defined limits can create cascading delays. Organizations should not only monitor their own resource usage but also maintain visibility into cloud provider quotas and ensure that subnet allocations account for extreme recovery scenarios where workloads may need to double or triple in size momentarily.
datadog The March 2023 Datadog outage was triggered by a simultaneous, global failure across multiple cloud providers and regions, caused by an unexpected interaction between a systemd security patch and Ubuntu 22.04’s default networking behavior. While Datadog typically employs rigorous, staged rollouts for infrastructure changes, the automated nature of OS-level security updates bypassed these controls. The incident highlights the hidden risks in system-level defaults and the potential for "unattended upgrades" to create synchronized failures across supposedly isolated environments. ## The systemd-networkd Routing Change * In December 2020, systemd version 248 introduced a change where `systemd-networkd` flushes all IP routing rules it does not recognize upon startup. * Version 249 introduced the `ManageForeignRoutingPolicyRules` setting, which defaults to "yes," confirming this management behavior for any rules not explicitly defined in systemd configuration files. * These changes were backported to earlier versions (v247 and v248) but were notably absent from v245, the version used in Ubuntu 20.04. ## Dormant Risks in the Ubuntu 22.04 Migration * Datadog began migrating its fleet from Ubuntu 20.04 to 22.04 in late 2022, eventually reaching 90% coverage across its infrastructure. * Ubuntu 22.04 utilizes systemd v249, meaning the majority of the fleet was susceptible to the routing rule flushing behavior. * The risk remained dormant during the initial rollout because `systemd-networkd` typically only starts during the initial boot sequence when no complex routing rules have been established yet. ## The Trigger: Unattended Upgrades and the CVE Patch * On March 7, 2023, a security patch for a systemd CVE was released to the Ubuntu security repositories. * Datadog’s fleet used the Ubuntu default configuration for `unattended-upgrades`, which automatically installs security-labeled patches once a day, typically between 06:00 and 07:00 UTC. * The installation of the patch forced a restart of the `systemd-networkd` service on active, running nodes. * Upon restarting, the service identified existing IP routing rules (crucial for container networking) as "foreign" and deleted them, effectively severing network connectivity for the nodes. ## Failure of Regional Isolation * Because the security patch was released globally and the automated upgrade window was synchronized across regions, the failure occurred nearly simultaneously worldwide. * This automation bypassed Datadog’s standard practice of "baking" changes in staging and experimental clusters for weeks before proceeding to production. * Nodes on the older Ubuntu 20.04 (systemd v245) were unaffected by the patch, as that version of systemd does not flush IP rules upon a service restart. To mitigate similar risks, infrastructure teams should consider explicitly disabling the management of foreign routing rules in systemd-networkd configuration when using third-party networking plugins. Furthermore, while automated security patching is a best practice, organizations must balance the speed of patching with the need for controlled, staged rollouts to prevent global configuration drift or synchronized failures.
datadog Datadog’s first global outage on March 8, 2023, served as a rigorous stress test for their established incident response framework and "you build it, you own it" philosophy. While the outage was triggered by a systemic failure during a routine systemd upgrade, the company's commitment to blameless culture and decentralized engineering autonomy allowed hundreds of responders to coordinate a complex recovery across multiple regions. Ultimately, the event validated their investment in out-of-band monitoring and rigorous, bi-annual incident training as essential components for managing high-scale system disasters. ## Incident Response Structure and Philosophy * Datadog employs a decentralized "you build it, you own it" model where individual engineering teams are responsible for the 24/7 health and monitoring of the services they build. * For high-severity incidents, a specialized rotation is paged, consisting of an Incident Commander to lead the response, a communications lead, and a customer liaison to manage external messaging. * The organization prioritizes "people over process," empowering engineers to use their judgment to find creative solutions rather than following rigid, pre-written playbooks that may not apply to unprecedented failures. * A blameless culture is strictly maintained across all levels of the company, ensuring that post-incident investigations focus on systemic improvements rather than assigning fault to individuals. ## Multi-Layered Monitoring Strategy * Standard telemetry provides internal visibility, but Datadog also maintains "out-of-band" monitoring that operates completely outside its own infrastructure. * This out-of-band system interacts with Datadog APIs exactly like a customer would, ensuring that engineers are alerted even if the internal monitoring platform itself becomes unavailable. * Communication is streamlined through a dedicated Slack incident app that automatically generates coordination channels, providing situational awareness to any engineer who joins the effort. ## Anatomy of the March 8 Outage * The outage began at 06:00 UTC, triggered by a systemd upgrade that caused widespread Kubernetes failures and prevented pods from restarting correctly. * The global nature of the outage was diagnosed within 32 minutes of the initial monitoring alerts, leading to the activation of executive on-calls and the customer support management team. * Responders identified "unattended upgrades" as the incident trigger approximately five and a half hours after the initial failure. * Recovery was executed in stages: compute capacity was restored first in the EU1 region, followed by the US1 region, with full infrastructure restoration completed by 19:00 UTC. Organizations should treat incident response as a perishable skill that requires constant practice through a low threshold for declaring incidents and regular training. By combining out-of-band monitoring with a culture that empowers individual engineers to act autonomously during a crisis, teams can more effectively navigate the "not if, but when" reality of large-scale system failures.